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We study a recently proposed model in which an odd num-
ber of agents are competing to be in the minority. In the
model, the agents have one strategy in hand which is to fol-
low the most recent history. Each agent is also assigned a
value p, which is the probability that an agent will follow the
trend. Evolution is introduced through the modification of
the value of p when the performance of an agent becomes un-
satisfactory. We present numerical results for the distribution
of p values in the population as well as the average duration
between modifications at a given p for different values of the
parameters in the model. Agents who either always follow the
trend or always act opposite to the trend, tend to out-perform
the cautious agents. We also point out the difference between
the present model and a slightly modified model in which a
strategy is randomly assigned to every agent initially.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Agent-based models of complex adaptive systems
(CAS) provide invaluable insight into the highly non-
trivial global behaviour of a population of competing
agents [1]. Typically, these models involve agents with
similar capability competing for a limited resource. The
agents share the same global information, which is in turn
generated by the behaviour of the agents themselves, and
they learn from past experience. A realistic situation, for
example, is where the index of a stock market is made
known to every participating agent: the agents must then
decide whether to buy or sell based on this global infor-
mation. It is, therefore, not surprising to see that these
models constitute an active part of the growing field of
econophysics [2,3].
One of the earliest models was proposed by Arthur [4].
The model, which is referred to as the bar-attendance
model, consists of N agents trying to decide whether to
attend a bar with a seating capacity L (L < N). The
attendance in the past weeks is announced to all agents,
forming the global information. A correct decision is to
attend (not to attend) the bar with an attendance less
than or equal to (higher than) the cutoff L. It turns
out that [4,5] the population cooperates or self-organizes
in the sense that the attendance in each turn is usually
close to L and the variance of the attendance can show
a minimum with increasing adaptability of the individ-
ual agents. This model shows a few features typical of
CAS. The cooperation in the system necessarily requires
an inhomogeneous population. If all agents were to de-
cide according to the same strategy, all of them would
act identically and hence lose. In fact, there is no a pri-
ori best strategy and a strategy good at one point in
time will become bad when too many agents use it. The
agents hence interact through the creation and sharing of
the global information, and are forced to make decisions
based on inductive, rather than deductive thinking [6].
The bar-attendance model is rather complicated in
that the actual attendance is announced. Challet and
Zhang proposed a binary game, called the minority game,
in which an odd number N of agents are competing to
be in the minority group [7,8]. The agents decide to
go into one of two rooms, with the winners being those
in the room with fewer agents. The outcomes are an-
nounced and form the global information. The agents
are assumed to have limited and similar capabilities in
that they all decide based on the outcomes of the re-
cent m turns. There are a total of 2m possible history
bit-strings of length m, thus forming a strategy space
consisting of a total of 22
m
strategies. Each agent picks
s strategies from this pool initially and uses the one with
the best accumulative performance in deciding the next
move. Detailed numerical calculations have revealed that
the standard deviation (SD) in the attendance in a room
shows a minimum as a function of m at a value corre-
sponding to N · s ∼ 2 · 2m. Johnson and coworkers [9]
suggested that the features can be understood in terms
of the dynamical formation of crowds consisting of agents
using, say, the best strategy at a particular moment in
time and anticrowds consisting of agents using the strat-
egy anti-correlated to the crowd. Basically the degree of
overlap in the strategies among the agents plays an im-
portant role. The condition N · s ∼ 2 · 2m favours the
formation of crowds and anti-crowds of comparable size
and leads to a minimum in the SD. The idea can be for-
mulated quantitatively in terms of the Hamming distance
[10] between strategies.
In both the bar-attendance and the basic minority
game, the strategies, once distributed at the beginning
of the game, are fixed and the agents adapt by choos-
ing the best-performing strategy in hand. Recently, we
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proposed a simple model consisting of an evolving pop-
ulation in which the agents can adapt by changing their
behaviour without the limitation imposed by the strate-
gies being initially distributed [11,12]. In this paper, we
report results on this model focusing on the possible seg-
regation of the population as a result of competition and
evolution. We introduce the model in Sec.2. Results are
presented in Sec.3. In Sec.4, we summarize our results
and point out the difference between our model and a
similar model proposed in Ref. [10] in an attempt to for-
mulate a theory of the present model.
II. THE GENETIC MODEL
We introduce a simple, yet realistic, model for an evolv-
ing population containing adaptive agents who compete
to be in the minority. Inspired by Ref. [7], we consider the
model of an odd number N of agents repeatedly choos-
ing to be in room “0” or room “1”. After each agent has
independently chosen a room, the winners are those in
the minority room. The “output” for each time step is
a single binary digit denoting the minority room. Each
agent is given the information of the most recent m out-
comes. Each agent also has access to a common register
or “memory” containing the outcomes from the most re-
cent occurrences of all 2m possible bit strings of length
m. Consider, for example, m = 3 and denote (xyz)w as
the m = 3 bit string (xyz) and outcome w. An example
memory would comprise (000)1, (001)0, (010)0, (011)1,
(100)0, (101)1, (110)0, (111)1. Following a run of three
wins for room “0” in the recent past, the winning room
was subsequently “1”. Faced with a given bit string of
length m, it seems reasonable for an agent to simply pre-
dict the same outcome as that registered in the memory.
The agent will hence choose room “1” following the next
000 sequence. If “0” turns out to be the winning room,
the entry (000)1 in the memory is then updated to be
(000)0. Simply put, each agent looks into the most re-
cent history for the same pattern of m bit string and
predicts the outcome using the history. In effect, each
agent holds one strategy and all agents hold the same
strategy, with the strategy being dynamical. The strat-
egy is hence to follow the trend. However, if all N agents
act in the same way, they will all lose. A successful agent
is one who can follow a trend as long as it is valid and
to correctly predict when it will end. To incorporate this
factor into our model, we assign to each agent a single
number p, which we refer to as the “gene”-value. Fol-
lowing a given m-bit sequence, p is the probability that
the agent will choose the same outcome as that stored in
the memory, i.e., he will follow the current predictor. An
agent will reject the prediction and choose the opposite
action with probability 1− p.
To incorporate evolution into our model, we assign
+1 (−1) point to every agent in the minority (majority)
room at each time step. If an agent’s score falls below
a value d (d < 0), his gene value is modified. The new
p value is chosen randomly from a range of values cen-
tered on the old p with a width equal to R. We impose
reflective boundary condition to ensure that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Our conclusions do not depend on the particular choice
of boundary conditions. For R = 0, the agents will not
change their gene values at all. For R = 2, the new gene
value is uncorrelated with the old one upon modification.
III. RESULTS
We have carried out detailed numerical studies of our
model. Initially, each agent is randomly assigned a gene
value in the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The population is allowed
to evolve. We focus on two quantities, P (p) and L(p),
in the asymptotic limit. Here P (p) is the frequency dis-
tribution of gene values, typically taken in the long time
limit over a time window and normalized to unity; L(p) is
the lifespan defined as the average length of time a gene
value p survives between modifications. Figure 1 shows
L(p) and P (p) (inset) as a function of p for different val-
ues ofm. The other parameters are taken to be N = 101,
R = 0.2 and d = −4. The most interesting feature is that
P (p) becomes peaked around p = 0 and p = 1, with a
similar behaviour in L(p). The results are insensitive to
the initial distribution of p. Surprisingly the results indi-
cate that agents who either always follow or never follow
what happened last time, generally perform better than
cautious agents using an intermediate value of p. Fig-
ure 1 also shows that there is no explicit dependence on
m for P (p) and L(p). We have also checked that differ-
ent values of d do not change the normalized distribution
P (p). The lifespan L(p) obviously does depend on d as
shown in Fig. 2 for d = −1,−2, · · · ,−9. A more negative
value of d leads to a longer time between modifications
and hence a longer time in approaching the asymptotic
P (p). The inset in Fig. 2 shows L(p)/|d| as a function of
p for different values of d and all the data fall onto one
curve showing L(p) ∼ |d|.
Figure 3 shows the dependence of L(p) and P (p) (in-
set) as a function of p for different values of R. Differ-
ent values of R affect the time it takes to approach the
asymptotic limit, since a larger value of R gives the agent
a larger jump in gene-value space in order to arrive at the
final P (p). However, L(p) and P (p) do not depend on the
value of R. It should be pointed out that even when P (p),
and hence L(p), takes on its asymptotic form, agents are
still constantly modifying their gene values. It is a dy-
namical state in that agents are changing their gene val-
ues while keeping the form of P (p) unchanged. Figure 4
shows P (p) and L(p) for games with different numbers
of agents. The normalized P (p), again, does not depend
on N , while the L(p) is generally higher for games with
larger N . Our results thus show that the segregation in
the population as indicated in P (p) is robust and insen-
sitive to the choice of parameters in our model. It merely
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comes from the desire of the agents to do the opposite
of the majority. The segregation implies that the popu-
lation as a whole samples the microstates of the system,
i.e. the different possible distributions of the gene value
in the population, unevenly as time evolves. There are
microstates in which the total points deducted per turn
are relatively small and the population tends to stay in
these microstates longer giving rise to the segregation
[11].
Note also that the results are symmetrical about p =
1/2 for both P (p) and L(p). Basically, it follows from a
symmetry in the game in that the past behaviour con-
tains the same information for every agent, and hence
there is no advantage to any agent. Therefore, the game
has the same distribution P (p) regardless of whether the
real, or static, or random history is followed; and we could
replace the strategy at any moment by its inverse. Thus,
agents with gene values p and 1 − p are doing equally
well.
IV. SUMMARY
We have presented numerical results for our genetic
model consisting of an evolving and competing popula-
tion. Agents who always follow or always act opposite to
the predictor, out-perform the cautious agents. Recently,
an attempt was made to explain quantitatively the form
of the asymptotic gene distribution P (p) [10]. The the-
ory, while succeeding in obtaining a P (p) similar to those
reported here, was formulated based on a slightly differ-
ent model. In the modified model, one strategy in the
pool of 22
m
possible strategies (corresponding to a game
with memory m) is assigned randomly to each player at
the beginning of the game, in addition to the gene value.
Thus, the modified model in Ref. [10] corresponds to a
minority game with s = 1 plus the inclusion of a gene
value p for each agent. Although the modified model
and the present model both correspond to cases with
one strategy per agent, the strategy is dynamical in the
present model and is constantly updated; in the modified
model the strategy is fixed. It is, therefore, interesting
to check numerically if the two models give identical re-
sults for P (p). Figure 5 shows P (p) for the modified
model with m = 1, 2, · · · , 10. We notice that, unlike our
present model, the modified model’s P (p) depends on
m with the small m limit approaching the result of our
model. The difference between the two models comes
from the fact that for large values of m, the strategies
held by the agents in the modified model are likely to
be uncorrelated. In this case, each agent cannot adapt
to the behaviour of the other agents and the distribution
P (p) becomes flatter as m increases. Interestingly, the
quantitative analysis in Ref. [10], which is based on the
modified model, does not give an m-dependent P (p).
A more complete theory of our present genetic model
can be formulated by investigating the attendance dis-
tribution in one of the two rooms. The approach [13]
is to relate the average success rate of an agent in an
N -agent game to a (N − 1)-agent game with a partic-
ular agent being singled out, and to derive an expres-
sion for the average success rate in which the effect of
the complicated interaction (and self-interaction) of the
agents is isolated. Such a consideration leads to an av-
erage success rate τ(p) for an agent using a gene value p
of the form τ(p) ∼ 1/2 − A(N)p(1 − p), where A is an
N -dependent parameter which decreases with N . The
lifespan L(p) is related to the average success rate by
L(p) ∼ d/(1/2− τ(p)) [10], hence leading to the symme-
try about p = 1/2 for both L(p) and P (p) as discussed
in the last section [14]. Results along this line will be
reported elsewhere [13].
Our model forms the basis for incorporating various
interesting complications. One possibility is that the
agents, instead of competing to be in the minority group,
are trying to attend a room with a specific cutoff ca-
pacity L; the winners are those deciding to attend (not
to attend) with the turnout being less than or equal to
(greater than) the cutoff capacity. In this case, it is possi-
ble for the population distribution P (p) to become frozen,
i.e. no further modifications of gene values among the
agents, as time evolves for large (or small) enough value
of the cutoff [15].
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FIG. 1. The lifespan L(p), which is the average duration
between modifications for a gene value p, as a function of gene
value p for m = 1, 2, · · · , 8. The inset shows the distribution
of gene values P (p) as a function of p for different values of
m. Both L(p) and P (p) are insensitive to m. The other
parameters are N = 101, d = −4 and R = 0.2.
FIG. 2. The lifespan L(p) for different values of d. The
curves at p = 0.5 from bottom to top correspond to
d = −1,−2, · · · ,−9. The inset shows that all the data fall
onto one curve if we plot L(p)/(−d) as a function of p. The
other parameters are N = 101, m = 3 and R = 0.2.
FIG. 3. The lifespan L(p) and the distribution of gene val-
ues P (p) (inset) as a function of p for R = 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 2.0.
Note that both L(p) and P (p) are insensitive to R. The other
parameters are N = 101, m = 3 and d = −4.
FIG. 4. The lifespan L(p) as a function of p for
N = 11, 21, · · · , 81. The inset shows P (p) for different val-
ues of N . The other parameters are m = 3, d = −4 and
R = 0.2.
FIG. 5. The distribution of gene values P (p) as a function
of p for the modified model in which each agent is assigned a
strategy initially. At p = 0.5, the curves from bottom to top
correspond to m = 1, 2, · · · , 10. The P (p) depends on m in
the modified model in contrast to the genetic model.
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